This paper contributes to the growing literature on anti-corruption accountability by comparing individual decision making under different norms and institutions. Employing an experimental methodology, I examine how the propensity to report corruption differs between Northern and Southern Italians, two groups that experience very different levels of corruption in everyday life. Further, the experiment measures behavior under two different institutional environments: a "strict enforcement" condition where reports always result in sanctions against perpetrators, and a "lax enforcement" condition where 50% of reports are ignored. I find no difference in the behavior of Northern and Southern Italians in the lax enforcement condition, but in the strict enforcement condition, Southerners are much more likely to denounce wrongdoing, while the behavior of Northerners remains unchanged. These results demonstrate that exposure to corruption may strengthen accountability norms, but only in the presence of highquality enforcement institutions.
Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of research on possible approaches to combatting corruption. While one branch of this literature focuses on the design of optimal institutions to reduce opportunities for graft and increase incentives for honesty (Andvig et al. 2001; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978) , other work highlights the many ways in which ordinary citizens can bring about greater governmental accountability (Adserà, Boix and Payne 2003; Besley 2006; Grimes 2013; Olken 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999; World Bank 2004) . And amongst the many possible actions that citizens can take, one of the most important involves the reporting of corruption to formal oversight agencies.
As many scholars have noted, law enforcement authorities seldom have adequate time and resources to investigate all potential instances of malfeasance (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2010) . Many oversight agencies must therefore depend upon citizens to sound "fire alarms" to expose corruption and provide evidence against wrongdoers. Furthermore, while political elites may have incentives to block reform, the same is not true for citizens, who are often corruption's primary "victims," and therefore ideally placed to push for change (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006) . Indeed, case studies of successful anticorruption campaigns have highlighted the importance of grassroots monitoring in improving accountability (Grimes 2013; Manion 2009; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006 ).
Yet although the literature often assigns citizens (or civil society) a central role in controlling corruption, individuals' motivations to engage in such actions (particularly in endemicallycorrupt societies) remain poorly understood. Does the willingness to engage in grassroots monitoring di↵er between high-corruption and low-corruption societies? And does the answer depend on whether individuals in these societies have access to e↵ective and e cient enforcement institutions?
This article explores theoretically and empirically the relationship between institutions, corruption exposure and anti-corruption monitoring. I report results from an economic experiment involving participants from both the North and the South of Italy. Importantly, research has shown that the level of corruption di↵ers significantly across these regions (Banfield 1958; Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Golden and Picci 2005; Putnam 1993) , and participants who grew up in these separate environments are likely to have internalized different norms about corruption tolerance. The experimental design allows me to isolate the e↵ect of these norms by holding the quality of enforcement institutions constant. Further, in a second treatment, I also vary the probability that someone reported for corruption will be formally sanctioned, and thereby test whether regional e↵ects depend upon the e↵ectiveness of formal oversight agencies. By comparing individual decision-making under di↵erent norms and institutions, this paper contributes to the growing literature on "bottom-up" accountability in the anti-corruption context (Barr, Lindelow and Serneels 2009; Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Cameron et al. 2009; Grimes 2013 ).
This article precedes as follows. The following section discusses the relevant literature on corruption and social norms, focusing particular attention on how greater exposure to corruption in everyday life may shape individuals' willingness to participate in grassroots monitoring. I then describe the experimental design and the two participant populations, before presenting the results. Finally, I discuss several implications of the experimental findings, before concluding with some suggestions for future research.
Related Literature
Several recent studies have examined the relationship between cultural norms and corruption (Barr and Serra 2010; Cameron et al. 2009; Fisman and Miguel 2007; Paldam 2002; Treisman 2000) . For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) investigate the parking behavior of United Nations diplomats during a period in which they were immune from enforcement actions. Even in the absence of legal constraints, diplomats from low-corruption countries accumulated significantly fewer unpaid parking violations (a form of abuse of o ce), suggesting an important role for cultural norms in constraining opportunistic behavior. Barr and Serra (2010) report similar findings from a laboratory experiment in the UK: higher exposure to a "culture of corruption" in students' home countries is associated with a greater propensity to bribe in the lab. However, while recent studies focus on variation in corrupt behavior, relatively little research has examined how corruption tolerance may also vary across societies (Cameron et al. 2009 ). However, even though individuals in high-corruption societies may be more likely to engage in illicit behavior themselves, this does not necessarily mean that they are more likely to accept such behavior on the part of others. Indeed, ethnographic research has shown that people can perceive the same corruption scenario as right or wrong, depending on whether they are the victims or the beneficiaries of the transaction (Hasty 2005; Olivier de Sardan 1999; Smith 2010) . Therefore, it is important to study how everyday exposure to corruption shapes the norm of accountability.
In theory, greater exposure to corruption in daily life can a↵ect accountability norms in one of two ways. On the one hand, citizens in high-corruption countries may have a more intimate understanding of the cost of corruption for society, which can fuel greater public anger and indignation (Hasty 2005; Miller 2006; Olivier de Sardan 1999; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012; Rothstein and Torsello 2013; Smith 2010 Given the degree of public discontent, individuals in high-corruption societies may be more willing to take a stand against malfeasance, as compared to their counterparts in countries with lower levels of graft.
On the other hand, socialization into a "culture of corruption" may increase individuals' acceptance of wrongdoing (Barr, Lindelow and Serneels 2009 ). This may be especially true if individuals come to believe that bribery is a routine strategy, employed by all "normal" citizens, to gain access to public services (Cameron et al. 2009; Miller 2006; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012) . In this context, to sanction someone for accepting a "gift" would seem over-scrupulous, hypocritical, or even insensitive to "the way things work." In this way, beliefs about the ubiquity of illicit payments serve to justify and excuse such behavior, thereby weakening the norm of accountability.
Empirical evidence from large-N cross-national studies would seem to support this latter argument. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between corruption tolerance and country corruption rankings, as measured by Transparency International (TI)'s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. Higher scores along the x-axis indicate a more "honest" society. The y-axis displays the percentage of individuals who indicated that they would be willing, hypothetically, to report an incident of corruption. The data are drawn from TI's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, and are available for over 100 countries. The figure shows that the higher level of corruption in a country, the less willing its citizens are to report malfeasance, suggesting that corruption exposure and corruption tolerance are directly related. However, this relationship is complicated by the fact that individuals in di↵erent societies face di↵erent sets of institutional constraints. In particular, while citizens can report corruption, they cannot directly enforce the law. Instead, they must depend on formal oversight agencies to act upon their complaints and sanction the perpetrators (Grimes 2013) . However, in countries where corruption is pervasive, such o ces may be lacking, ine↵ectual, or themselves deeply corrupted (Bauhr and Grimes 2014) . As a consequence, citizens may appear to tolerate corruption not because of moral lassitude, but rather because they perceive e↵orts to sound the alarm as futile (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012) .
The failure to precisely distinguish the institutional versus normative drivers of bottom-up accountability has profound policy implications. If citizens are socialized into a "culture of corruption," then institutional reforms are unlikely to unleash a wellspring of popular action, and greater accountability most likely arises from more stringent top-down monitoring. By contrast, if citizens in highly-corrupt societies are indeed fed up with graft, then it may be possible to harness this popular indignation in the fight against corruption, provided that the necessary institutional tools are available. However, using cross-national data, it is often di cult to identify whether we are in the former case or the latter (because we rarely observe highly-corrupt states with e↵ective enforcement institutions, and vice versa).
In principle, economic experiments can help tease apart the influence of institutional and normative factors on the willingness to blow the whistle on corrupt behavior. By allowing researchers to directly control the "rules of the game," experiments can isolate the e↵ect of normative constraints, as well as simulate di↵erent institutional conditions. Yet, the few studies that have adopted this approach have produced inconclusive results. For example, Cameron et al. (2009) compared participants from four societies with di↵erent corruption levels (Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore) in terms of their propensity to both engage in and punish bribery. Surprisingly, Cameron et al. (2009) find support for both of the arguments discussed above: while Australians tended to be more critical of corruption than Indians (which would support the acceptance hypothesis), Singaporeans appeared to be more tolerant of bribery than Indonesians (which would support the indignation hypothesis). Given these mixed results, more cross-cultural research examining how exposure to corruption a↵ects accountability norms is needed. The experiment described in the following section contributes to filling this gap.
Methodology
The Corruption Game
The experiment described in this paper consists of a very simple bribery game which simulates petty corruption in a public hospital setting in Italy, a country noted for its large North-South variation in corruption levels (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2013a,b; Golden and Picci 2005; Putnam 1993) .
2 This setting was selected because the medical sector is regarded as amongst the more corruption-ridden institutions in Italian society.
3 Furthermore, while we may doubt that ordinary citizens have encountered corruption in other scenarios (e.g. public procurements), participants are likely to have a more concrete idea of how corruption in the health sector operates. 4 Finally, since public hospitals in Italy are public institutions, individuals should expect impartial treatment, and any personal favoritism is likely to be understood as corruption. Overall, the framing brings a measure of realism, and a↵ords us greater confidence that behavior in the lab will more faithfully reflect choices in real life.
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In the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Nurse, Early Patient (PE), or Late Patient (PL). Essentially, PLs must decide whether to o↵er (and Nurses must decide whether to accept) a "gift" in exchange for faster service. PEs are harmed by this transaction, and must decide whether to punish corrupt Nurses by reporting them to the hospital administration.
The full game is described below. However, in this paper, I am mainly interested in how social norms and institutions a↵ect the decision to blow the whistle on corruption. Therefore, in my analysis, I focus attention only on the behavior of PEs, and the main dependent variable under consideration is the rate at which PEs report corrupt transactions.
Overall, the experiment is very similar to the designs employed by Barr and Serra (2010) and Cameron et al. (2009) . As in Cameron et al. (2009) 's experiment, the victim of corruption (the PE) is allowed to punish the beneficiaries. However, the imposition of sanctions here is dependent upon an exogenous institution (the hospital administration), which may or may not act on the report. In addition, as in the previous two studies, all interactions are anonymous and one-shot. This ensures that punishment conveys no economic benefit, so that the decision to denounce corruption is not a↵ected by the anticipation of possible future economic gains. 6 Therefore, PEs' willingness to report should directly reflect norms of accountability.
Both PEs and PLs begin the experiment with an initial endowment of 32 experimental currency units (ECU). The patients were told to imagine that they are waiting in line to see the doctor. Waiting is costly for Patients, but because PEs have arrived early at the hospital, they face a very short wait and can keep their entire initial endowment. However, PLs face a very long wait and, as a result, will lose 16 ECU. PLs thus retain 32 -16 = 16 ECU in the round.
However, PLs can potentially skip the line and avoid this loss. Each PL is randomly matched to one Nurse, 7 and has the option of o↵ering this Nurse a "gift" worth 6 ECU in exchange for being allowed to jump the queue. 8 In other words, if the PL makes an o↵er and the Nurse accepts, the PL no longer has to wait, and consequently earns 32 -6 = 26 ECU. Although in this case the PL pays the cost of the gift, he is much better o↵ at the front of the queue (with 26 ECU) than at the back (with 16 ECU). O↵ering a gift is a dominant strategy in the game: if the PL chooses not to o↵er, he is sure to lose 16 ECU. The same result obtains if the PL o↵ers a gift but his o↵er is rejected by the Nurse (however, having your o↵er rejected carries no additional cost). On the other hand, the PL's earnings increase from 16 to 26 if his o↵er is accepted. Therefore, PLs can only gain by o↵ering.
For their part, Nurses must decide whether to accept gifts from Patients. Nurses begin the game with 24 ECU, and retain this amount if they are o↵ered no gifts, or if they refuse to accept PL o↵ers. On the other hand, if they decide to accept gifts (and in exchange permit PLs to skip the line), they will receive 6 additional ECU for each gift they receive. 9 Nurses do not know exactly how many PLs they are interacting with in each round, but must choose what they would do if any gifts are o↵ered.
As a consequence of the exchange between the PL and the Nurse, all of the PEs must wait a little longer in line and each su↵ers a small loss of 3 ECU. However, PEs are not merely passive bystanders in the game, but rather operate as potential monitors. Specifically, each PE is randomly matched to one Nurse, and is told that he can "overhear" conversations between this Nurse and other patients, so that he will know if this Nurse has exchanged any favors. PEs can then report this Nurse to the hospital administration, which may or may not impose a fine. If the Nurse is sanctioned, he forfeits any gifts he has received, and also pays a fine of 9 ECU, so that he retains only 24 -9 = 15 ECU at the end of the round.
However, reporting is always costly to the PE, who must pay a reporting "fee" of 3 ECU regardless of whether the Nurse is actually punished. In fact, from the PE's perspective, reporting is never rational in a one-shot game: even if the Nurse is fined, PLs who have skipped the line still remain at the front. In other words, PEs will always lose for every PL that skips the line, irrespective of their own actions. All players make their decisions simultaneously, and the one-shot game has a single equilibrium outcome: all PLs o↵er gifts, no PEs report corrupt exchanges, and all Nurses accept o↵ers.
Finally, the experiment is implemented under two di↵erent conditions, which simulate two di↵erent levels of institutional e↵ectiveness. In the "lax enforcement" version, the PE's report results in the imposition of a sanction only 50% of the time. The other 50% of the time, the Nurse pays no fine and keeps whatever gifts he has received. However, in the "strict enforcement" version, a Nurse who is reported by a PE is sanctioned 100% of the time. Importantly, although the incentives facing Nurses change across the two conditions, the monetary payo↵s facing PEs remain identical: any indication of a willingness to punish corruption costs 3 ECU, regardless of whether the punishment is actually imposed.
Procedure
The experiments reported in this paper were conducted as part of a larger research project on corruption which I implemented at [Northern Italian university] (Greiner 2004) . Several days prior to the start of the experiment, individuals in the database received an email informing them of the opportunity to take part in an upcoming research project, and inviting them to sign up for an experimental session at a particular date and time. The email also included information on the estimated length of each session, as well as the expected earnings per participant.
Once the participants arrived at the laboratory at the appointed date and time, they were provided with a randomly-drawn anonymous ID number, and assigned to a corresponding personal computer terminal.
11 The participants undertook all the experimental tasks via computer, and the terminals were partitioned to ensure that individuals could not communicate during the experiment, nor observe what other people were doing. The participants were also informed that they would have the opportunity to earn ECU during the experiment, which would be converted into real money at the end of the session. At this point, the participants were asked to sign a consent form informing them that their decisions and payments would remain anonymous, and that they could discontinue participation in the experiment at any time. Any individual who wishes to leave the experiment early could elect to receive a 3 euro show-up fee. However, in practice, every participant remained until the end of the session.
We begin the session by conducting a short computerized survey to capture basic demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, etc), before proceeding to explain the rules of the experiment. The participants make decisions for three rounds. In each round, players are randomly assigned to a new role, so that by the end of the game, the players have had the chance to play in all 3 roles. Importantly, the players were shown the results of each round only at the end of the entire session, i.e. after all of the experimental tasks had been completed. This feature, coupled with the fact that the participants are randomly rematched in each period, means that behavior in the game should be una↵ected by signaling, reputation formation, wealth e↵ects or serial correlation in decisions (Cameron et al. 2009 ). Finally, since the rules are somewhat complex and the payo↵s hard to keep track of, at the moment of making their decision, the players were shown a summary of their choices and the possi-ble consequences for themselves and for other participants. In general, the vast majority of participants rated their own understanding of the game as excellent.
Upon completion of the experimental tasks, the participants were shown feedback on their decisions, and informed of their total earnings. The participants then answered a short debrief questionnaire before receiving payment. On average, each session lasted 1 hour and 10 minutes and the participants were paid approximately 13 euros (USD 17.50).
Participants
I employ a version of Barr and Serra (2010)'s recruitment strategy to capture variation in corruption exposure. In particular, this strategy assumes that students in the same university may have been exposed to di↵erent levels of corruption in their home societies. If such di↵erential exposure leads to the development of di↵erent norms, then such e↵ects may manifest in behavior in the lab. Along these lines, [Northern Italian university] admits a large student body, and enrolls students not only from its surrounding region of [anonymized] , but also from the South of Italy.
12 Furthermore, as shown in Table 1 , citizens from the South tend to have much higher exposure to corruption (including with respect to the health sector) than their compatriots further North, which may be reflected in di↵erent accountability norms. Finally, if participants bring these norms into the experiment, then we should see di↵erences in the reporting decisions of Northern and Southern Italians.
To ensure a rough geographic balance, recruitment to the experiment was stratified by participants' region of origin, and the institutional treatments were randomly assigned within each stratum. In all, the data reported in this paper are drawn from ten di↵erent experimental sessions involving a total of 156 participants (44% from the North, and 56% from the South). In the overall sample, 51.3% of the participants were male, and the average age was slightly over 25 (s.d. = 3.7 years). A large minority (39.7%) were undergraduate students, while the remainder were masters students.
13 Table 2 compares demographic characteristics across Northern and Southern participants and treatment groups, and reports p-values for di↵erences in means. 14 Reading each row from left to right, we see that Northerners and Southerners are roughly balanced on almost all characteristics in each of the treatment groups. Reading each column from top to bottom, we see no statistically significant di↵erences for Northerners across institutional treatments. Data from the 2013 European Quality of Governance Index (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2013a,b) . Scores are based on survey responses about the following topics: (1) the amount of perceived bribery by others in the respondents' area; (2) the respondents' own experience with bribery in the public sector; (3) the quality of the public health care system in the respondents' area; (4) the impartiality of the public health care system in the respondents' area; and (5) perceived corruption of the public health care system in the respondents' area. All ratings have been standardized. Regional classifications are given by N = North, C = Central, and S = South.
However, for Southerners, there are fewer undergraduates in the strict enforcement treatment. I control for this fact in the analyses reported below. 
Research Questions
If all individuals are perfectly selfish, nobody would report corruption in either of the institutional conditions, since reporting leaves PEs strictly worse o↵. However, if PEs are motivated by a norm of accountability, they may choose to denounce corrupt Nurses despite the monetary disincentives. 15 Moreover, the literature also shows that accountability norms can di↵er across societies (Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter 2008) in ways that may be related to the institutional environment (Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012) . I therefore designed the experiment with the following research questions in mind:
2. Do these e↵ects depend upon the quality of enforcement institutions (i.e. the probability that these reports will be acted upon)?
Results and Discussion
How do norms and institutions interact to shape the reporting of corrupt behavior? Overall, 90 out of 156 participants (57.7%) indicated a willingness to report a corrupt Nurse.
As a preliminary step, we can break this number down in two ways. First, pooling both institutional conditions, we observe very little di↵erence in the choices of Northerners and Southerners: 57.4% of Northerners indicated that they would make a report, compared to 58.0% of Southerners (p-value = 0.94). Second, if we pool Northerners and Southerners, we find weak evidence of an institutional e↵ect: while only 52.3% of participants in the lax enforcement treatment were willing to report, this number rises to 64.7% in the strict enforcement treatment. However, this di↵erence is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.12).
These comparisons obscure the fact that Northerners and Southerners may behave di↵er-ently, depending upon the institutional condition to which they have been assigned. This interaction e↵ect is illustrated in Figure 2 . Here we see that while an approximately equal number of Northerners (57% -58%) chose to report in both the lax and strict enforcement regimes, the reporting rate amongst Southerners is lower under lax enforcement (48%), but higher under strict enforcement (69%). In other words, it seems that the institutional treatment e↵ect is driven almost entirely by the behavior of Southern participants.
To check the robustness of these findings, I report the marginal e↵ects and corresponding standard errors and significance levels from a series of Probit estimations in Table 3 . Columns (1) and (2) confirm the null results from the unconditional comparison of reporting rates across cultural and treatment groups, respectively. In column (3), I add an interaction term between Northern participants and assignment to the strict enforcement condition. The positive coe cient on North suggests that under lax enforcement, Northerners are slightly more likely to report than Southerners, although this e↵ect is also not statistically significant. By contrast, the estimated coe cient on Strict now indicates that for Southern participants, individuals in the strict enforcement treatment are significantly more likely to report than their peers in the lax enforcement treatment. Notice also that the coe cient on the interaction term is almost identical in size, except that it is negative, suggesting that the corresponding Note: robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. I report the marginal e↵ects of continuous variables and the e↵ect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
treatment e↵ect for Northerners is close to zero (although the interaction is not significant at conventional levels).
Column (4) adds controls for age and gender (the results are unchanged), but does not control for undergraduate status. Instead, I have elected to rerun the above analysis separately for undergraduates and masters students (columns 5 and 6). This is because previous research has shown that the di↵erence between undergraduate and graduate students may moderate "cultural" e↵ects in corruption games, and therefore it may be appropriate to consider the two groups separately. For example, Barr and Serra (2010) find that although the behavior of Oxford undergraduate students reflects the corruption norms of their home countries, the same is not true for graduates. As shown in Figure 3 , I find a similar e↵ect in my experiment. Specifically, amongst masters students, there are no significant di↵erences in the propensity to report across regional and treatment groups. However, the main patterns from Figure 2 are even more starkly displayed amongst undergraduates: compared to the lax enforcement condition, the reporting rate is a whopping 51.7% higher amongst Southerners in strict enforcement condition, and this e↵ect is much stronger than the corresponding e↵ect for Northerners (as indicated by the now significantly negative coe cient on the interaction term in column (6) of Table 3 .) In summary, it appears that the institutional e↵ect of stronger enforcement is region-specific, and applies only to the undergraduates in my sample.
Why might masters students from Southern Italy behave di↵erently from their undergraduate counterparts? Barr and Serra (2010) outline two possible explanations: selection and secondary socialization. Selection may account for the split results if the types of individuals who become masters students hold di↵erent values and norms than the types of individuals who are not masters students. Selection presents a problem because it indicates that the experimental findings do not generalize to the larger population of Italians. However, in my sample, undergraduates and masters students are not drawn from two mutually-exclusive segments of the population. Instead, undergraduates all have the potential to become masters students; they have simply not yet been presented with the option of continuing their studies. Therefore, there is likely to be substantial overlap in terms of the types of individuals who fall into the two categories. For this reason, it is unlikely that the split results are an artifact of selection bias.
Can any alternative explanations account for these findings? One possibility may be that the results merely reflect di↵ering propensities to punish in general across societies, rather than di↵erent norms of accountability specific to corruption. For example, writing in the U.S. context, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argue that individuals growing up in the American South are socialized into a "culture of honor" that makes them more likely to retaliate against perceived personal o↵enses. While the issue of whether Southern Italians are more honor conscious is certainly an interesting question worthy of additional research, this account cannot explain why Southern participants in this experiment are more likely to make a report only in the strict enforcement condition. Neither can this interpretation explain why the behavior of Northerners does not change under the di↵erent institutional settings.
A more plausible objection might attribute these results to sample selection of a di↵erent sort than that previously discussed. In particular, it may be the case that the Southerners who choose to migrate to the North of Italy are especially fed up with corruption in their home regions, and therefore seize upon the opportunity to punish it. But here again, the fact that Southern participants in the "lax enforcement" condition act no more scrupulously that Northerners suggests that selection is unlikely to drive the e↵ects we observe. However, future research might address this possibility directly by replicating the present experiment at a Southern university.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to understand how norms and institutions shape citizens' decisions to hold corrupt actors accountable. It investigates how the propensity to report corrupt behavior in an experimental setting varies between Northern and Southern Italians, two groups that experience very di↵erent levels of corruption in everyday life. The experiment also varies the strength of enforcement institutions, which many scholars believe to significantly influence the willingness to denounce malfeasance. I find that while institutional quality does not a↵ect the behavior of Northern participants, Southern participants are significantly more likely to report corruption under a strict enforcement regime. More specifically, this e↵ect seems to be driven by the behavior of undergraduate participants -i.e. those individuals who have most recently moved from the South to [Northern Italian university] . Overall, the study shows that individuals from a "high corruption" society can indeed be engaged in the fight against corruption, provided that the right institutional arrangements are in place.
More generally, the findings argue for an endogenous model of accountability where "bottomup" and "top-down" enforcement e↵orts are mutually reinforcing. In particular, at the outset, the enforcement authorities demonstrate their credibility by acting upon citizen reports and punishing high-profile perpetrators. These actions serve to strengthen the belief that citizens are now facing a "strict enforcement" regime, and thereby generate more frequent "fire alarms" from the public. The loop is closed as greater civic engagement multiplies the investigatory and prosecutorial capacities of the formal authorities.
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Yet while the experimental results suggest that such a virtuous cycle is indeed possible, they also raise several question about the scope conditions under which such a process might occur. How representative are North and South Italy of "honest" and "corrupt" societies more generally? Even controlling for the institutional environment, might exposure to widespread malfeasance breed indignation in some societies, but corruption acceptance in others? And how might these results depend upon the specific situational context (i.e. the hospital setting) examined?
As Cameron et al. (2009) note, the relationship between norms of accountability and corruption exposure is extremely complex, and this paper is one of the first to study this phenomenon with an eye towards incorporating institutional e↵ects. However, more research on a wider range of societies with di↵ering levels of corruption and institutional e↵ectiveness is needed to fully resolve these outstanding questions.
Notes
1 The correlation is significant only for undergraduate students, but not graduate students. One explanation may be that home-country norms converge to the UK norm over time.
2 Although standard practice is to use neutral language, I deliberately chose to frame my experiment in order to simulate a real-life corrupt transaction. As noted by Harrison and List (2004) , abstract contextfree experiments do not necessarily provide more general findings if the context itself is relevant to the decision-problem facing participants. On the other hand, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) find that loaded language does not make a di↵erence in the corruption game they study. 6 By contrast, in a multi-period game, individuals may choose to punish in the hope of deterring corruption and decreasing future harm (Heckathorn 1989) .
7 A technical note on the matching procedure: every PL is assigned to play with exactly one Nurse.
However, it could very well be the case that a particular Nurse has more than one PL matched to him, and also that some Nurses have no PLs matched with them.
